We exploit the over-subscription of Workplaces with Stipends to define a control group. The paper finds that the program was successful at targeting poor and vulnerable people, and that leakage to non-poor households was small. Using propensity score matching, the paper finds that the program's stipend mitigated the impact of job loss and, in the short term, raised participating household incomes by 37 percent relative to similar households not benefiting from the program. The paper also finds that the foregone income for this program was less than foregone incomes estimated in other countries. This suggests a dearth of incomegenerating opportunities in Latvia; thus the program provided temporary employment opportunities and helped the unemployed mitigate the impact of the crisis. However, relative to the depth of the crisis in Latvia, the Workplaces with Stipends program scale was small, which meant long waiting periods for program applicants.
program, darba praktizēsana, simtlatnieku programma, or the 100-Lats-programma. 2 The program aimed to strengthen the social safety net in response to the unprecedented drop in economic activity. 3 Specifically, the program created temporary labor-intensive employment for people who had lost their jobs but were ineligible for unemployment benefits; also, the program benefitted communities through maintenance activities.
Public works programs are an important safety net intervention used widely around the world. Countries have introduced public works programs with diverse objectives such as protection from large covariate shocks (natural disaster, macroeconomic crisis, or seasonal labor demand shortfalls), to protect households from temporary job losses, fight poverty, or help poor people gain temporary employment (del Nino, Subbarao, and Milazzo, 2009 ). The key characteristic of a public works program is that national governments, local governments, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) finance or implement a program that creates temporary employment for people who are willing and able to participate; workers increase their incomes and communities benefit from the resulting public goods new or improved infrastructure, or services delivery.
Existing literature on public works focuses on project design and institutional or administrative arrangements; however, the literature on program effectiveness is relatively thin and primarily focused on low-income countries. 4 Existing, though limited, evidence suggests that public works programs help poor and vulnerable people cope with hard times, especially in the short term; however, evidence of longer term impacts is mixed (Baez et al., 2010) . 5 Also, past work has stressed that it is important not to accept net transfers from the program (wage or stipend) as the net household income gain because public works beneficiaries must forgo some income to participate in the program, which requires a time commitment from participants. Because the value of foregone income depends on national context, specific context (prevailing market conditions), and household labor-supply decisions, the effectiveness of public works programs also varies across countries and situations. 6 For example, using a quasi-experimental approach, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) show that in Argentina's Trabajar program, the average net gain to public works participants is about half of the gross wage. Galasso and Ravallion (2004) found that in Argentina's Trabajar and Plan Jefes y Jefas programs, a large share of participants were women who would not otherwise have 5 Many of these examples are from Argentina. 6 Datt and Ravallion (1994) found that other family members took up displaced productive activities when someone joined a workfare program in rural India. Such behavioral responses reduce foregone income.
3 been participating in the labor force. Therefore, under the Trabajar and Plan Jefes y Jefas programs, about half of the employment gain came from unemployed workers, and the other half arose from inactive workforce participants.
Latvia's public works program is an interesting case study. First, Latvia launched and implemented a public works program in response to a global financial crisis. Second, Latvia provides lessons on how public works programs can respond to a significant deterioration in labor market conditions. Third, relatively few public works program evaluations exist for upper-middle income countries (Latvia is an upper-middle income country) compared to low-income and lower-middle income countries. This paper evaluates Latvia's WWS program as a crisis response safety net instrument.
Subject to data constraints and other restrictions, this paper complements other studies by evaluating the targeting performance of the WWS program and the effectiveness of the WWS program as a crisis mitigation instrument. The paper relies primarily on a unique household survey administered to 3,000 households during December 2010 -March 2011.
The findings of the paper are as follows. First, WWS targeted the poor households very well. Second, WWS was successful at increasing short-term household incomes by 37 percent relative to similar households not benefiting from the program, and helped those households to cope with the crisis. Third, the foregone income was low, and some of the foregone income is accounted for by loss of other safety net payments suggesting that the WWS did not replace other labor opportunities. The WWS program increased household income by LVL 67 while the actual WWS payment was LVL 100 per month. Thus, the Latvian WWS program experience highlights the usefulness of public works programs as short-term safety net instruments during times of crisis, even in upper-middle income countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 presents an overview of the WWS program; Section 2 describes the data used in this paper; Section 3 outlines the methodology used to evaluate the WWS program's targeting performance and impacts; Section 4 presents results of targeting performance and short-term program impacts on 4 participant welfare; and Section 5 concludes.
WWS Program Description
During 2008-10, as the global financial crisis unfolded in Latvia, labor market conditions worsened and unemployment reached historic highs. A large and increasing proportion of registered unemployed people was not receiving unemployment benefits, or was receiving very low benefit amounts (Hazans, 2012) All registered unemployed people who were not receiving unemployment benefits were eligible to participate in the WWS program and opportunities were provided on a firstcome, first-served basis. 9 The WWS program participants were eligible to participate up to six months with a two week minimum requirement. There was no limit to the number of 7 On March 31, 2011 the exchange rate was: e1.00: US$1.42: LVL 0.704 8 There is significant variation in the duration of participation in the WWS program, with some participants completing a few days and others completing the allocated six months before returning to the program to perform another period of participation.
9 Registered unemployed could also chose WWS instead of unemployment benefits if unemployment benefits were less than the WWS stipend.
times a worker could benefit from WWS. 10 10 After completing six months in a year, a beneficiary can re-register for the WWS program. 11 In July 2011, the stipend was reduced to LVL 80 per person per month. 12 No doubt a lower stipend would have resulted in a shorter waiting list, but Government set the rate at LVL 100 to maintain political support. 6 regular municipal functions. 13 However, there were rules that prohibited replacement. To ensure that WWS positions were newly created, Government provided municipalities with technical assistance to illustrate tasks that were eligible for program support, and followed up with inspections.
Data
This paper uses data from a unique household survey commissioned by the State Employment A random sample of 1,000 people was drawn from each Strata 1 (T1) and Strata 2 (C1);
and, a random sample of 500 people was drawn from Strata 3 (T2) and Strata 4 (C2). In this paper, we call the individuals who were originally selected in random sampling as assigned individuals irrespective of the group they belong to. The questionnaire was administered to 13 Municipalities outsourcing is particularly common among the larger and wealthier municipalities. Due to the time lapse between sampling and the actual interview, about 396 assigned persons in group T1 finished WWS participation, and about 222 assigned persons from group C1 began participating in WWS. We dropped those assigned persons who have different status than actually assigned. This is done to avoid contamination bias. In addition, about 64 assigned persons in group T1 have an additional household member enrolled in WWS besides the assigned individual. We also dropped these assigned individuals to avoid over estimation of the impact of WWS on household welfare. Similarly, we dropped 22 assigned workers from group C1 as some other household member was enrolled in the WWS program.
14 The final sample size used in the analysis is: T1 -721; C1 -769; T2 -463; and C2 -396.
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Omitting some of the assigned individuals (from T1 and C1) to avoid contamination bias raises concerns about selectivity bias. However, as shown in appendix Table A1 , we do not find significant differences in the characteristics of individuals who were dropped from T1 from the remaining individuals in T1. We find significant differences only in 3 out of 28 characteristics of those individuals from C1 who were dropped and those who remained in C1. Hence, it is safe to assume that omitting observations to avoid contamination bias does not introduce a selection bias. In this paper, we focus on targeting and short-term income impacts of the WWS program, and for this we compare assigned workers in T1 and C1.
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The WWS Household Survey collected aggregate household income information and in- 14 We are grateful to Mihails Hazans for his advice on sampling. 15 We keep only those assigned workers in T1 group who have participated in WWS for at least one month. This led to further dropping of 12 assigned individuals from group T1. 16 Assigned individuals in group T2 and C2 were surveyed to study the medium/longer-term employability impacts of the WWS program. dividual income components. At the aggregate level, the survey asked households: "What is the total monthly income of your household at the moment?" In addition to the single question on monthly household income, the survey also collected individual income components, including the WWS stipend, through different modules. We define Income-1 as the monthly income as reported by the household and Income-2 as monthly income derived through summation of different income components including WWS stipend. Although the survey collected information on the WWS stipend, it did not collect information on the duration for the WWS stipend payments. 17 Nevertheless, WWS participants received LVL 100 per month and there is no evidence suggesting under or over payments, we added the LVL 100 (LVL 100 for T1; 0 for household in C1) to household monthly income to get total monthly household income including WWS stipend. 18 There are marginal differences in average incomes based on the two income definitions (reported in Table 1 ). As program impacts differ based on income choice, we report impacts using both income measures. However, our preferred income measure is income-2, because it is obtained by aggregating different income components, and households are more likely to omit the WWS stipend in reporting the total aggregate monthly income.
Methodology

Targeting Performance
To assess WWS program targeting performance, we rank beneficiary households in the welfare distribution of the entire population. However, by design, the WWS Household Survey used in this paper represents only the registered unemployed population; the ranking of 17 It is also not feasible to find out the duration of payment from the time spent in WWS program, as the duration of payment will not exactly match the time spent in the program.
18 Almost 99 percent of assigned individuals in group T1 reported that payments were correct. As discussed in the data section, only one person (the assigned person) in each household is participating in WWS in the T1 group, and no one in the C1 group is in the WWS program. 9 sampled households in the overall population is unknown. We therefore combine the WWS Household Survey data with quintile cut-offs from the 2009 Household Budget Survey (HBS).
Because the HBS is representative of the entire Latvian population, the quintile cut-offs generated from that welfare distribution can be used to determine the quintile to which the WWS beneficiary household belongs. However, latent heterogeneity between WWS participants and those on the WWS waiting list may bias impact estimates. As WWS enrolment is on a first-come, first-served basis, the possibility remains that those individuals who were more likely to be impacted by any crisis are first to register for the program and the first to participate in the program. To control for observable heterogeneity, propensity score matching is used to construct a counterfactual outcome from the sample of individuals on the waiting list. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) we use propensity score matching to estimate outcomes without the program (i.e., the average outcome for individuals who did not participate in the WWS program) and compare that outcome to the outcome for observationally similar participants in terms of propensity to participate in WWS program. Propensity is estimated using P rob(T i = 1|X i ),
Program
i.e., probability of participating (T i = 1) in the WWS program conditional on observed (pre-determined) covariates, X i .
Although propensity score matching (PSM) controls for observable differences, it does not rule out the possibility of selection bias due to unobserved differences between participants and even a well-matched comparison group. We use Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum, 2002) to assess the sensitivity of our results to the selection on unobservables. While other methods exist to assess the sensitivity of PSM estimates to the selection on unobservables, Rosenbaum 
Program Impact: The Impact of the WWS Program on Welfare
As discussed earlier, we believe that workers in control group C1 are similar to those in treatment group T1. To confirm this, in Table 3 we check whether the characteristics are similar among individuals in these two groups. Based on 32 ex ante variables, we find statistically significant differences in only 11 variables: age, gender, relationship to head of household, share of household members in 0-5 age range, home ownership, or living in a house held by private entity, and residing in different regions. 21 These findings suggest that although the assigned individuals in the treatment and control groups have characteristics that are statistically similar, they also differ significantly in some observed characteristics. Therefore, we control for observed differences before comparing outcomes of WWS participants and non-participants.
To control for observable heterogeneity, we adopt a propensity score matching technique to construct a counterfactual outcome from the sample of individuals on the waiting list.
First, we estimated a probit model for calibrating the propensity score on the pooled sample of assigned individuals in the treatment and control groups. The complete model is reported in Table 4 . The explanatory power of the model is low, suggesting that the two groups of individuals are similar with respect to many observed characteristics. Most explanatory variables have insignificant coefficients; geography, gender, relationship to household head, share of household members in 0-5 age range, and higher education have significant impact on WWS participation. 22 Propensity score results confirm our expectations from the simple averages reported in Table 3 , as there are no differences in simple averages of many 21 Technically, these variables were recorded at the time of interview; however, we do not expect these variables to have changed because of participation in short term WWS program.
22 If the treatment was assigned randomly, none of the covariates is expected to significantly affect participation.
13 characteristics, and they are insignificant in the propensity score model.
As expected, we find considerable overlap in support between the treatment and control groups across the entire region (Figure 2 ). Table 5 explores whether the model has balanced all ex ante variables, i.e., we calculate differences between treatment and control groups for each characteristic in the matched sample. Conditioning variables are balanced, as indicated by the t-tests in Table 5 , Panel A. Matching balances differences observed in the raw data; in the matched sample, no significant difference remains between treatment group and control group. Matching also significantly reduced standardized bias (SB). In most empirical studies, a SB below three percent, or five percent after matching, is seen as sufficient (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008 ). In our case, the SB is below three percent for almost all covariates.
We reported another test in Panel B of Table 5 . Following Sianesi (2004), we re-estimated the propensity score on the matched sample, i.e., only on participants and matched nonparticipants, and compare the pseudo − R 2 s before and after matching. The pseudo − R 2 indicates how well the regressors explain the probability of participation. After matching, no systematic differences should exist in the covariate distribution between the two groups, therefore the pseudo − R 2 should be low. In our case, the pseudo − R 2 indeed approaches zero after matching.
Thus the diagnostic analysis reveals that matching controls for differences in unmatched data. In Table 6 , we present the average impact of the WWS program on short-term household incomes. 23 We use Kernel matching (KM), which is a nonparametric matching estimator that uses weighted averages of (nearly) all -depending on the choice of the kernel function -individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. 24 Thus, one major advantage of these approaches is the lower variance, which is achieved because more information is used.
Households in the treatment group earn about 37 percent more than the households in the control group households (based on income-2 measure). Thus, the WWS program acted as an effective short-run safety net (i.e., during program enrollment). The average gain for participant households was about LVL 67 (income-2 definition), which was about two-thirds of the WWS stipend. Thus foregone income is about LVL 33. Since some income is foregone, the targeting performance reported in the earlier section (based on zero foregone income)
overestimates the WWS program pro-poor finding. In Table 7 , we present the average gains (three-quarters of Trabajar wage) using nearest estimator, while about AR$100 gains using other estimators.
Although the PSM estimation controls for selection of observables, any selection of unobservables can bias results. We assessed the sensitivity of our results to the selection of unobservables using Rosenbaum bounds. Table 8 Relative to other countries, foregone income in the WWS program in Latvia is low. This suggests that the control group was unable to generate income, likely because of a lack of labor market opportunities, which was also reflected in historically high unemployment rates; and because of the low coverage and benefits of poverty-targeted social assistance programs. 25 However, some foregone income can be explained by the loss of other safety net income for participants, e.g., guaranteed minimum income (GMI). For example, the treatment households earn 6 LVL less (4 LVL) compared to control group households from GMI (unemployment benefits) ( Table-9 ). Moreover, the households that qualify for other safety nets might prefer the WWS program because it offers higher benefits. When households choose WWS, they lose top-up benefits such as those available under GMI. However, municipalities in Latvia might encourage WWS participation because the WWS costs are borne entirely by the central government, whereas municipal governments co-finance GMI benefits.
Also, the work requirement makes the safety net politically acceptable.
In addition to looking at WWS program impact on income gains, we also looked at the impact on subjective measures such as coping strategies adopted by the households during the crisis (Table 10) . 26 Particularly clear is the WWS program impact on nutrition and 25 About 83 percent of workers who have participated or are enrolled in the WWS program report they had to wait; almost 46 percent of workers report waiting six or more months before participating. Among people who are now waiting, more than three-quarters report waits of three or more months, and about 34 percent have been waiting for six or more months. This suggests that for many of workers, WWS was the only opportunity available.
26 Households were asked whether they adopted any coping strategy to mitigate the crisis impacts, and a number of possible strategies were numerated with the option of yes or no.
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health outcomes: a lower proportion of households participating in WWS reported reducing their food intake (quantity and frequency), or reducing doctor visits (preventive and during illness) than households in the control group. This further confirms that the WWS program acts as an important safety net for WWS beneficiary households. We find that the WWS program was successful at targeting poor and vulnerable people, and leakage to non-poor households was small. The relatively low stipend and labor-intensive works helped ration the program and deterred non-poor people from participating. To measure the WWS program impact, this paper exploits excess demand for WWS to construct a counterfactual group. Using a propensity score matching (PSM) method, we find that the WWS program raised short-term household incomes by 37 percent relative to similar households not benefiting from the program. The WWS program increased household income by LVL 67 while the actual WWS payment was LVL 100 per month. Thus, participants forego some income (about LVL 33) to participate in WWS; some of this foregone income is 27 Households reported that the WWS program is useful as a safety net and as a program to uplift the local community. Most participants view the WWS program as an important safety net, and 96 percent believe that WWS projects are beneficial to the community.
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due to loss of other safety net payments such as guaranteed minimum income benefits.
Foregone income due to the WWS program participation is lower than foregone incomes estimated elsewhere. This suggests that non-participants, who were on the waiting list, were unable to find alternate income-generating options. Long waiting lists for the WWS program also corroborate the finding that workers had very limited options. Thus the WWS program provided employment opportunities when prospects in the labor market were limited, and transferred additional income to beneficiary households. The WWS program experience highlights the usefulness of public works programs as short-term safety instruments during times of labor market crisis, even in upper-middle income countries. The WWS program experienced long waiting lists and large numbers of workers re-registered, which demonstrates that people valued the WWS program and that the program was too small given the devastating impact of the crisis. 
